Pittsburgh University School of Law

Scholarship@PITT LAW
Articles

Faculty Publications

2008

Core Values in Conflict: The United States Approach to Economic
Assistance to the Elderly
Lawrence A. Frolik
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, frolik@pitt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons, Elder Law Commons, Health Law and Policy
Commons, Insurance Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, Social Welfare Law Commons, and the
Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lawrence A. Frolik, Core Values in Conflict: The United States Approach to Economic Assistance to the
Elderly, 1 Phoenix Law Review 325 (2008).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_articles/247

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship@PITT LAW. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@PITT LAW. For more
information, please contact leers@pitt.edu, shephard@pitt.edu.

CORE VALUES IN CONFLICT: THE UNITED STATES APPROACH TO
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE ELDERLY

Lawrence A. Frolik*
In devising programs to assist the elderly, the United States has, for the
most part, rejected the social welfare model, which is premised on a belief
that the government has an obligation to care for the elderly. The social
welfare model often relies on social insurance where all members of society
are required to contribute to a fund, which is then distributed through
insurance to aid members of society who are in need. The current Medicare
program, the federal subsidized health-care insurance program for the
elderly, is an example of social insurance. The social welfare model,
however, is not universally accepted. Many Americans believe that beyond
a minimum safety net, the government should not, and likely cannot, save
everyone from every bad outcome. Individuals must accept personal
responsibility and care for themselves. To rely on the government is not
only impractical but leads to a loss of liberty and autonomy.
As a result of this conflict in values, the United States does not usually
operate programs modeled on social insurance, but rather provides care to
those identified as "needy." This does not mean that the United States
refuses to provide subsidized care for the elderly; only that the government
is not seen as required to provide such care and does so only out of a regard
for the individual's need, not because of any fundamental obligation to
provide universal coverage. The result is that nearly every governmental
program that assists the elderly is under constant scrutiny and must
continually defend its existence.
The degree of economic assistance that the government ought to
provide to the elderly is a political question open to challenge and debate.
Even the premise that the government might want to assist the elderly is
open to question in the minds of some. Consequently, the fundamental
question is not, "How much should the government assist the elderly?" but
rather, "Should the government assist the elderly?" The answer to the
question of whether the government should assist the elderly is almost
always "yes," but merely asking the question colors the debate as to who the
government should assist, in what way, and how much assistance should be
provided.
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Co-Author of LAWRENCE A.
FROLIK & MELISSA C. BROWN, ADVISING THE ELDERLY OR DISABLED CLIENT (2007);
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With subsidies for the elderly open to challenge, advocates for the
elderly must be prepared to provide answers to the three basic questions:
"Who among the elderly should the government assist?
• What form should the assistance take?
• How much assistance should be provided?
For example, although the federal Social Security program has been
operating for over seventy years, it still meets with opposition. A small
minority still contends that the government has no responsibility, and
perhaps even no right, to provide income to the elderly, except in the case of
the direst need. Although such objections find little support, they are
nevertheless afforded a hearing and, thus, require a response. A larger
minority claims the present system is unsustainable and so must be radically
changed.'
Advocates for reform of the Social Security program do not feel a need
for their proposals to guarantee a universal minimum income to the elderly
sufficient to lift all of them above the poverty level. For example, advocates
of so-called "personal responsibility" are free to propose reforms that will
almost certainly result in some elderly being very poor, yet still claim that
their proposed reforms would be true to national values such as autonomy
and self-reliance, which to them are more important than alleviating elder
poverty.
Currently, Social Security and Medicare are subjects of intense debate
because they face an uncertain financial future. Unless both programs
either reduce benefits or increase revenues, in a few years both programs
will be paying benefits that exceed their revenues; as some claim, the
programs will go "bankrupt." The debate as to how to fix both programs,
that is, how to realign revenues with expenditures, is currently awaiting the
results of the 2008 Presidential election. The debate will be renewed,
however, and will continue to reflect the national schism on the relative
value of social insurance and personal responsibility. Because of these
profound differences in philosophy, all suggested reforms of Social Security
and Medicare are very politicized and will be extremely difficult to enact.
Additionally, a problem much less appreciated by the general public is
how to pay for long-term care for the elderly, an issue which plagues the
federal and state governments. Currently, Medicaid pays for about half of
1 One suspects that these opponents have an unspoken dislike for the very concept of
social insurance as antithetical to personal liberty.
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the cost of long-term care for the impoverished elderly.2 Medicaid is a joint
federal and state program of which the federal government subsidizes nearly
one-half of the cost and establishes minimum-eligibility criteria. The state
governments pay the other one-half of the cost and administer it with the
result that Medicaid programs vary somewhat from state to state.4 What
does not vary is the growing cost of the program, which is particularly
vexing to state governments that see their Medicaid programs absorb an
ever-increasing proportion of their budgets. While not a topic much
discussed by politicians, those who understand the program realize that
major changes are needed to reverse an unsustainable trend-too many
beneficiaries receiving care that is too costly.
Although not thoroughly discussed herein, the financial difficulties of
Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid are not going away, and when the
debate is renewed, the question of how to make them financially stable
promises to be very contentious.
Social Security is financed by a wage tax that currently produces more
revenue than the annual expenditures for retirement benefits.5 The current
excess of income over expenditures was an intentional result of the reforms
of Social Security that occurred in the 1980s. 6 At that time, Social Security
was about to bring in less revenue than it was spending.7 To insure the
financial well-being of Social Security, Congress changed it from a "pay-asyou-go" program to one that generated a surplus to be spent down in future
years.8 Up until that time, Social Security had always been a program in
which the taxes on workers paid for the benefits for the current retirees.
Each generation paid the benefits for the preceding generation, and that
generation in turn had its retirement benefits paid for by the next generation
2

Medicaid paid 57% of the cost of nursing home care in 1997. CELIA S. GRABEL, NAT'L

CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL . &
PREVENTION,
CHARACTERISTICS OF ELDERLY NURSING HOME CURRENT RESIDENTS AND DISCHARGES: DATA

FROM THE 1997 NATIONAL NURSING HOME SURVEY, ADVANCE DATA No. 312 (April 25,

2000) (based on Congressional Budget Office data).
3 Richard L. Kaplan, The Inheritance Threat of Long-Term Care Expenses, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 41 ST ANNUAL HECKERLING INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING 17-1, 17-17

(Mathew Bender 2007).
4 Id. at 17-18.
5 Social Security also provides benefits to younger disabled individuals, but that aspect of
the program is not part of this discussion.
6 LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & ALISON MCCHRYSTAL BARNES, ELDER LAW:

CASES AND

MATERIALS 163 (4th ed. 2007).
7 id.

8 See John Svahn & Mary Ross, U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Social Security Amendments of
1983: Legislative History and Summary of Provisions, 46 Soc. SEC. BULL. 3 (July 1983).
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of workers. 9 However, in the 1980s, it became apparent that changing
demographics were making that concept less feasible. The ratio of retirees
collecting benefits to workers paying the wage tax was falling, resulting in
an increased burden on workers. The trend continues today. In 2005, there
were three workers paying the wage tax for every retiree receiving benefits
or a 3:1 ratio. By the year 2030, that ratio will be 2:1.10 Similar to the
1980s, to keep the system solvent, workers may need to pay sharply
increased wage taxes to keep Social Security solvent.1'
During the 1980s, the wage tax was raised enough to generate annual
surpluses. 12 For the first time, Social Security began to raise money to
accumulate funds to pay future benefits. 13 For the past twenty years, the
surpluses have been invested in the United States Treasury notes that pay a
fixed rate of interest, so that, today, Social Security has over $2 trillion of
saved surplus. 14
The era of surplus revenues, however, is coming to a close. The exact
year can only be estimated, but current estimates suggest that, by 2017,
Social Security revenues will be less than the benefits paid. 5 Although6
starting small, the revenue to expenditure gap will gradually widen.'
Initially, the deficit can be made up by the interest due on the treasury bonds
held by the Social Security trust fund. 17 By 2027, however, the program
will have to begin to draw down principal by redeeming the treasury bonds
that it holds. 18 Though very large, the surplus held in the form of the
treasury bonds will not last forever. It is estimated that, by the year 2041,
the surpluses will be exhausted, and the revenue gap will remain.' 9 The
annual shortfall is estimated at 25%, or put another way, the current wage

9 FROLIK & BARNES, supra note 6, at 162.
10 John Burritt McArthur, Private Pensions and the Justification for Social Security, 48
S. TEx. L. REV. 1, 31 (2006).
11FROLIK & BARNES, supra note 6, at 162.

12 U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., THE 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE

FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST

FUNDS, H.R. Doc. No.

109-103 (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/

TR06/trO6.pdf [hereinafter 2006 Annual Report].
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 id.
17 id.
18 Id.
19 Id
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tax will only pay about 75% of the promised benefits once the surplus is
exhausted.2 ° Many refer to this as the coming crisis of Social Security.
Others claim the crisis will arrive much sooner, estimating that the
annual revenues become less than the annual expenditures near 2017.
When that occurs, Social Security will begin to spend the interest on the
treasury bonds to make up the shortfall. The question then becomes how
will the federal government pay the interest on the bonds when it has an
annual deficit that it has paid for in part by borrowing the surpluses from
Social Security?
To pay back Social Security, the government will have to:
" increase the deficit of the federal budget;
"increase general-tax revenues by raising the income tax;
"raise the Social Security wage tax; or
"reduce Social Security benefit payments.
None of these alternatives is attractive. An increase in the deficit is not a
solution and may lead to greater inflation. Raising any taxes, including the
Social Security wage tax, is politically very unpopular and, according to
President Bush and other leading Republicans, absolutely unacceptable.
Reducing benefits could mean either raising the retirement age necessary to
qualify for benefits or lowering the amount of benefits paid to some or all
retirees, which in turn is likely to lead to greater poverty among the elderly.
Any cut in benefits would be fiercely resisted by the elderly and with
good reason. Those who paid Social Security wage taxes between 1985 and
2017 will have paid, not only for the benefits of retirees, but also for part of
their own retirement benefits. They were the first generation that was taxed
to pay for part of their own benefits. Reducing the benefits of these workers
would penalize them twice-first, by taxing them to help pay for their own
benefits and, second, by reducing their benefits.
Therefore, Social Security is facing two crisis points: one near 2017,
when expenditures exceed revenues, and again near 2041, when the
surpluses run out. These events have caused many individuals and interest
groups to offer possible solutions, so many that it is not feasible to cover
them in detail. Instead, this Article presents the solutions grouped together
into a few categories that reflect common underlying values.

20 id.

PHOENIX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:325

One group of commentators who apparently subscribe to notions of
social insurance favors a continuation of the current Social Security with no
fundamental changes. 2' They note that the crisis can be solved by:
* Using the interest paid to Social Security on the treasury
bonds that it owns to meet the shortfall until about 2027.22
At that time, Social Security should start selling bonds to
meet the revenue shortfall. To pay the interest and
eventually repay the bonds, the government should increase
the federal income tax as needed to raise the additional
funds.2 3 The rise in the income tax should be borne
primarily by the top five or ten percent of the income
earners based upon the premise that their incomes have
risen disproportionately over the past two decades.
* Avoiding the revenue shortfall of 2041 by raising the
wage tax and by increasing the percentage of income
subject to the wage tax (which suggests that, the sooner the
tax is raised, the less it will have to be raised). The
combined employee and employer wage tax is currently
12.4% (each pays 6.2%).24 If it were raised in 2008 to a
combined 14.4%, Social Security would be solvent for
another seventy-five years or until about 2080. Currently,
about 85% of wage income is subject to the tax ($102,000
in 2008, adjusted annually for inflation).25 That percentage
has declined in recent years to about 84% of wages, down
from the historical 90% coverage, reflecting the rapid rise
in earnings by upper-income employees (whose incomes
have risen faster than inflation).26 A return to 90%
coverage of wages is recommended by many and would cut
the shortfall over the next seventy-five years by 45%
although all earnings up to $180,000 would be subject to
the Social Security wage tax. Some even advocate 100%
21 See Kathryn L. Moore, Social Security Reform:

Fundamental Restructuring or

Incremental Change?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 341, 343 & nn.6-7 (2007).
22 Id. at 342 & n.3.
23

Id. at 372 (citing Robert M. Ball, The Social Security Protection Plan: How We Can

Cope-Calmly-With the System's Long-Term Shortfall (Jan. 2006), http://www.zfacts.
com/metaPage/lib/Ball-2006-SSProtectionPlan.pdf).
24 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101(a), 311 l(a) (2000).
25 Moore, supra note 21, at 371.
26 Id.
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coverage, taxing all earnings-just like the Medicare wage
tax.27

- Eliminating the practice of indexing benefits to the
Consumer Price Index, which some economists contend
overstates the degree of inflation for the elderly by up to a
1% per year. In other words, if Consumer Price Index rises
by 3%, benefits should not be raised that percentage, but
rather by about 2%.28

Other suggestions are more drastic, but still maintain the essential
nature of the Social Security program. These suggestions demonstrate a
lack of commitment to the social-welfare model (evidenced by a reluctance
to increase revenues, that is, raise taxes):
- Some commentators would have the Social Security
program invest 40% of the $2 trillion surplus in stocks and
so gain an estimated 3.5% higher annual return. This
would reduce the shortfall over the next seventy-five years
by 40%. Of course, the return on stocks could be better or
worse with a corresponding effect on the shortfall. Not
surprisingly, some of the strongest advocates for this
proposal are investment firms and banks. Advocates do not
agree as to who should make the investment choices. A
popular idea would have the Social Security Administration
buy indexed mutual funds rather than actively trading
stocks.
e Other commentators believe that the current benefit
schedule is not sacrosanct. They note that, if benefits were
immediately cut by 13%, Social Security would be solvent
for the next seventy-five years. 29 There is very little
support for this proposal, though many advocate some level
of reduction in benefits, particularly for the retirees
receiving the largest benefits. Some advocate a reduction
27 See id. at 369.
28

Andrew G. Biggs, Jeffery R. Brown, & Glenn Springstead, Alternative Methods of

Price Indexing Social Security: Implicationsfor Benefits and System Financing, 58 NAT'L

TAx J. 483, 501 (2005).

29 Craig Copeland, Comparing Social Security Reform Options, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF

(Employee Benefit Research Inst., Washington,
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/0505ib.pdf.

D.C.), May 2005,

available at
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in benefits for retirees with other sources of retirement
income.
Others answer that, because higher income
workers paid more Social Security wage taxes, they should
receive more benefits. Moreover, if the benefits to higherincome retirees were cut, they would not support the
program and might urge a radical transformation of Social
Security.
Some suggest that raising the retirement age, the age at which full
retirement benefits are paid, would be a logical step in light of rising life
expectancy. 30 At present, the age for full retirement benefits is sixty-six,
and that will gradually rise to age sixty-seven by the year 2017. 3' Some
would immediately raise the age to sixty-seven and index it in the future to
the growth in life expectancy.32
Advocates for workers with physically demanding jobs reject any
further rise in the age of retirement. They claim that age sixty-seven is too
high as a retirement age in light of the nature of their jobs. 33 AfricanAmericans, who have a shorter life expectancy (age sixty-five) than white
Americans, also object because an increase in the retirement age would
result in a greater loss of benefits for them than for whites.34 Others point
out that Social Security also provides disability benefits for individuals
unable to work because of a mental or physical disability. Because the
number of workers who apply for disability rises with age, some believe
that workers claim disability as a means of retiring early. Given that the
rate of disability increases with age, raising the retirement age may increase
the number of workers filing for disability benefits. If this is true, a rise in
the retirement age will raise the likelihood that more workers will become
disabled before the increased retirement age, thus resulting in Social
Security paying more disability benefits even as it pays fewer retirement
benefits.
Not all commentators believe that Social Security should survive.
Those with a strong aversion to social insurance prefer to replace it with

30 Jonathan Barry Forman, Making Social Security Work, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 145,
175
(2004).
31 Id.

32 See id. (citing U.S. Soc. SEC. ADMiN., 1994-1996 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
SOC. SEC.,
REPORT OF THE 1994-1996 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, Vol. I, at 20 (1997)).
33 Moore, supra note 21, at
382.
34 Kathryn L. Moore, Raising the Social Security Retirement Ages: Weighing the Costs
and Benefits, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 599 (2001).
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private-retirement accounts.35 Others want to greatly reduce its scope by
partial privatization.
President Bush, for example, advocates partial
replacement of Social Security with private accounts, 36 though many
believe
37
his ultimate goal is to completely dismantle the present system.
Under the proposal for private-retirement accounts, private accounts
would be mandatory savings accounts funded by a tax on earnings-very
much like the current Social Security wage tax.38 The tax proceeds,
however, would not go to pay benefits to retirees, but would be maintained
in an account for the benefit of the worker who would have control over
how the account was invested. 39 The amount of income that would be
diverted to the plan and amount of investment latitude given to the worker
varies from proposal to proposal. 40
The private-accounts proposals share a belief that an individual should
save for his or her own retirement. Rather than the social-insurance model
of Social Security that pools the risk of retirement by granting lifetime
pensions, advocates for private accounts promote autonomy and selfreliance. They favor individual control over retirement savings at the cost
of retirement-income security. They support the accumulation of personal
wealth over income redistribution. Proponents of private accounts claim
that it would help create an ownership society in which individuals would
be free to spend their retirement accounts or save them and pass them on to
their heirs.
Of course, even the most ideologically committed supporters of private
accounts concede that some low-income workers will not be able to save
enough to meet their basic needs in retirement, and a few even admit that
some workers will invest their account so poorly that they will not
accumulate sufficient funds for their retirement. Consequently, privateaccount supporters admit that some form of the current Social Security must
remain. However, they would significantly lower the Social Security wage
tax to free up funds for private accounts, while converting the Social
Security benefit structure to a minimum payment with only modestly higher
benefits for workers who paid higher wage taxes. In short, Social Security
35 See Moore, supra note 21, at 344.

36 Executive Office of the President, Strengthening Social Security for the 21st Century,

Feb. 2005, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/social-security/200501/
socialsecurity.pdf.
37 Moore, supra note 21, at 347.
38 Id. at 345.
39 Id. at 345-46.
40 See Kathryn L. Moore, Privatizationof Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71 TEMPLE
L. REv. 131, 132 (1998).
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would become a welfare program-a safety net-that gathers wage-tax
revenues and disburses a small, but universal, pension to all workers who
paid into the program.
The transformation of Social Security into a program that exists to
provide only a bare minimum level of benefits would change the perception
of Social Security as primarily benefiting the poor elderly. As such, Social
Security would no longer command the depth of support of the middle class
that it presently enjoys. The benefit levels paid by such a program would
become a subject of political debate, with proponents stressing the need for
more basic income support of the elderly and opponents arguing that the
benefits discourage individuals from working enough and saving enough to
provide for old age.
The proposals for reform of Social Security take on greater significance
because of the transformation of the American private-retirement system.
Traditionally, retirement income was said to rest on a three-legged stool that
consisted of Social Security, private-employer-provided pensions, and
personal savings. 41 Because of the expectation of employer-provided
pensions and personal savings, Social Security was expected to provide only
partial replacement of lost wages. The replacement rate for the average
worker is about 40%, somewhat higher for lower-earning workers and less
for higher-income workers.42
For workers with earnings above the
maximum wage tax, the replacement percentage is even less.43
When enacted, Social Security was seen as necessary social insurance
protecting workers against the loss of income resulting from retirement,
which was often involuntary. Either the employer forced the worker to
retire at an arbitrary age, usually age sixty-five, or the worker was
physically unable to perform his job as he aged. Today, mandatory
retirement is outlawed by the federal Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) 44 and far fewer jobs are so physically demanding that older
workers find them impossible to perform.
The result is that retirement is seen as a voluntary, desirable event. For
example, the average retirement age has settled between the ages of sixty41

Patricia E. Dilley, Hope We Die Before We Get Old: The Attack on Retirement, 12

ELDER L.J. 245, 252 (2004).
42 ALICIA

H.

MUNNELL, GOEFFREY SANZENBACHER & MAURICIO SOTO, CTR. FOR RET.

(Oct. 2007),
available at http://crr.bc.edu/briefs/working-wives-reducesocial-security-replacement_
rates.html.
RESEARCH, WORKING WIVES REDUCE SOCIAL SECURITY REPLACEMENT RATES

43 Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution Under the Current Social Security System, 61

U. Prrr. L. REv. 955, 966 (2000).
44 Age Discrimination Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1999).
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two to sixty-three. 45 The explanation is that age sixty-two is the earliest that
a worker can claim Social Security retirement benefits, albeit actuarially
reduced from what the worker would have received had he or she waited
until reaching full retirement age (currently, age sixty-six). 46 Some
workers, thus, see Social Security less as a form of social insurance that
saves them from poverty and more as an extra benefit that they have earned
by paying wage taxes.
This attitude has two consequences. First, some workers consider
whether a greater financial return would have been achieved by investing in
a private-retirement account in lieu of paying the Social Security wage tax.
Their perception is that they could have saved more by investing in a
private-retirement account instead of being subject to the Social Security
wage tax. Second, they could see Social Security as public benefits being
paid to individuals who do not really need it, or do not need it to escape
poverty. Both views reduce public support for Social Security.
The irony is that, as public support for Social Security is diminishing,
the need for it is growing. As stated, retirement income is supposed to have
three sources: Social Security, employer-provided-retirement pensions, and
personal savings. Unfortunately, today, only the Social Security source of
retirement income seems secure. Accordingly, they are an important aspect
of retirement income. For those seniors age sixty-five and older, who are in
the bottom-income quarter, Social Security provides over 85% of their
income. 47 Even for those in the top-income quarter, Social Security is the
source of 20% of their income. 48 As the transformation of the U.S. privatepension system continues, the importance of the Social Security program to
the economic security of the elderly will only grow.
The private-pension system is voluntary on the part of employers, but is
encouraged by a complex interaction of income-tax incentives and statutory
and regulatory governance of pension plans. In the 1950s, many of the
larger corporations adopted pension plans known as defined-benefit plans,
which provide a lifetime annuity to the retired employee. These plans were
most appropriate for employers who wanted to maintain a stable, lifelong
workforce because the defined-benefit plan rewarded employees who
remained with the employer for a long period of time.
45 Murray Gendell, Retirement Age Declines Again in 1990s, MONTHLY LABOR REV., Oct.

2001, at 12, 14.
46 FROLIK & BARNES, supra note 6, at 166.
47 DEBRA WHITMAN & PATRICK PURCELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG.,

Topics IN AGING: INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG OLDER AMERICANS IN 2005 3 (2006),
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32697_20060921 .pdf.
48 id.
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To operate a defined-benefit plan, an employer funds a trust during the
working career of the employee, relying on actuarial estimates of the
amount that must be contributed to insure the ability to pay the promised
annuity. The variables involved are length of employment, the wages paid
to the employee, and the investment return on the money contributed to the
plan by the employer. The latter, being subject to the fluctuations of the
stock market and interest rates paid on fixed securities, was often the most
volatile. The investment risk of a defined-benefit plan is on the employer,
with the employee guaranteed an annuity of a set amount as calculated by
the terms of the plan. If the plan has poor investment returns and fails to
meet its projected rate of return, the employer must make up the
difference.49
Changing work patterns in the 1980s and 1990s found fewer employees
spending their lives working for the same employer. Although blue-collar
workers might spend their lives with the same employer, white-collar
management and professional employees were likely to work for several
employers during their careers. For these employees, defined-benefit plans
held little attraction. In response, employers began to offer 401(k) plans
under which the employee, and sometimes the employer, contributes an
amount to an account and the assets in the account grow each year (or
decline) according to the investment return on the account.5 °
401(k) plans permit employees to manage the investments in their
individual account. 5 1 This feature is very popular because employers were
relieved of the burden of investing the employees' retirement funds; in
addition, many employees enjoy having the right to manage their own
money. 52 Of course, upon retirement, some employees can regret their
investment choices when they see how small the account is relative to their
income needs during retirement. Moreover, even if their investments are
successful, only a minority of employees contribute enough to their 401(k)
plans to fund a comfortable retirement.5 3

49 LAWRENCE

A. FROLIK & KATHRYN

L. MOORE,

LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION AND

WELFARE BENEFITS 30-34 (2004).
50 Susan J. Stabile, Is It Time to Admit the Failure of an Employer-Based Pension

System?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 305, 307 (2007).
5' 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2000).
52 See Debra A. Davis, Do-It-Yourself Retirement: Allowing Employees to Direct the
Investment of Their Retirement Savings, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 353, 353 (2006).
53 Stabile, supra note 50, at 311-12 ("Only about ten percent of participants contribute the
maximum amount permitted under the Code, and those who do are likely to be the highest
income employees.").
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The movement away from defined-benefit plans has been dramatic.
Although they still cover 21 million employees and pay benefits to 23
million retirees, the proportion of the workforce covered by these plans has
dropped by more than half-from 40% of all employees in 1980 to less than
20% today.54 The newly enacted Pension Protection Act of 2006 promises
to accelerate the trend as it imposes more administrative and funding
requirements on the employers who offer these plans.55
Overall, only about 50% of American workers participate in any
retirement plan.56 Almost all public employees participate in a retirement
plan although the plans vary considerably. Most, however, are a form of a
defined-benefit plan although the federal government has moved to a
defined-benefit plan. Lower-income workers participate in retirement plans
at much lower rates than high-income workers.57 Most U.S. employers have
fewer than twenty employees, and these employers usually do not offer a
retirement plan for their employees. The decline in union membership has
also resulted in fewer employees participating in a retirement plan.
At present, the official poverty rate for persons age sixty-five and older
is slightly less than the general population. 58 This could change as definedbenefit plans continue to disappear and retirees discover how difficult it is
to stretch out a lump-sum retirement benefit from a 401(k) plan over thirty
or more years of retirement.
As a result of the shift in investment risk from the employer to the
employee within retirement plans, American workers face greater income
insecurity in retirement. Curiously, at the same time, President Bush and
others advocate increasing that risk by reducing Social Security benefits in
favor of private-savings accounts.59
Fortunately, there is some good economic news for the elderly. With
the adoption of Medicare Part D, which pays for some prescription drugs,

54 ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDEN, COMING UP SHORT: THE CHALLENGE OF
401(K) PLANS 21 (2004).
55 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, §§ 902(f)(1), (e)(1), 120 Stat.
780, 1038-39 (2006).
56 Richard A. Ippolito, Bankruptcy and Workers: Risks, Compensation
and Pension
Contracts,82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1251, 1295 (2004).
57 FROLIK & MOORE, supra note 49, at 6.
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the elderly will pay less out-of-pocket for their health care.6 ° Unfortunately,
the expansion of Medicare is offset by the continuing decline of employerprovided health-care benefits for retirees. Medicare does not pay all of the
medical costs of its beneficiaries. Consequently, many elderly purchase
private health-care insurance to supplement Medicare. Some elderly have
supplemental health-care insurance provided for them by their former
employer. Many unions specifically bargain for retiree medical benefits,
particularly to cover prescription-drug expenses.
Faced with increasing global competition and the need to reduce costs,
many employers are cutting back or eliminating employee-health benefits. 6'
Absent a contract with a union, an employer is free to reduce retiree healthcare benefits for both prospective retirees and current retirees.6 ' The
combined effect of the loss of defined-benefit-retirement plans and the
elimination of retiree health-care benefits means that, in the years to come,
many retirees will face the thirty years of retirement with inadequate
retirement funds and be totally dependent upon Medicare for health-care
insurance.
Unfortunately, Medicare, the federally subsidized health-insurance
program for individuals age sixty-five and older, is also under financial
pressure. 63 The program is financed by a tax on wages of 2.9% split equally
between the employee and employer. 64 Medicare beneficiaries are also
charged a monthly premium for hospitalization benefits and prescription
drugs. 65 The premium is supposed to provide a predetermined percentage of
the cost of care, and as a result, premiums rise every year in response to the
increasing cost of medical care. 66 In addition, there is a 20% co-pay for
physicians' services.67 The Medicare wage tax plus the premiums paid by
the beneficiaries currently are enough to pay for the Medicare hospital
expenditures (known as Medicare Part A), but that is predicted to end in
68
about ten years and, hence, the claim that Medicare is facing bankruptcy.
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In contrast, payments for doctors (known as Medicare Part B) are financed
by general-tax
revenues and so cannot be projected to ever have a shortfall
69
funding.
of
There are at least two ways of fixing Medicare's finances. The first is
to reduce expenditures, including reducing payments to physicians. The
second is to transform the program into a needs-based program that offers
greater benefits to those with lower incomes, that is, turn Medicare into a
welfare program rather than a social-insurance program.
That
transformation, however, would severely reduce support of the program
from those not participating in the program.
Providing and paying for long-term care for the elderly is also a
looming issue. Although the problem is not well understood by the public
and this is not part of the political debate, the importance of how to provide
and pay for long-term care creates a serious political conundrum.
Currently, payment for long-term care for the elderly comes from a
variety of sources. About one-half of the payment comes from the income
and savings of the elderly themselves. 70 Another large, but unreported
source, is volunteer assistance by spouses, adult children, and other relatives
and friends. 7' The government pays for about one-half of the out-of-pocket
costs of care. Privately
owned long-term care insurance pays for only about
72
5% of the cost.
Government payment for long-term care comes overwhelmingly from
the Medicaid program, because Medicare is designed to pay for acute care,
not long-term care. Medicaid is a joint federal and state needs-based
program that pays for both acute and chronic care.73 The federal law of
Medicaid establishes eligibility criteria that states must follow if they are to
qualify for federal aid, but because states administer the program, Medicaid
operates differently from state to state. And, because states have to pay
about one-half of the cost of Medicaid, states try to limit eligibility to keep
down the costs. In response, many lawyers assist elderly individuals and
their families to obtain eligibility for Medicaid. For example, almost 5,000
lawyers belong to the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, and as
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part of their practices, many assist elderly clients in qualifying for Medicaid
reimbursement for the cost of their long-term care.
Medicaid pays almost exclusively for long-term care provided in a
licensed nursing home although the program is beginning to reimburse
some professionally provided care in the home. Regardless of where the
care is provided, Medicaid will only pay for long-term care after the
individual has exhausted his or her funds.74 It is the quintessential welfare
model of government assistance.
A single individual must have no more than $2,000 in savings and must
use all of his income towards his care except for $30 a month for personal
needs.7 5 Medicaid will then pay the difference between what the individual
can pay and the Medicaid-approved daily rate at the nursing home.7 6 The
amount that an individual can retain has not increased in years because there
is no political interest in permitting an individual to retain more savings. 77
If an individual is married, the spouse who lives at home (the
community spouse) is permitted to retain the house, household goods, a car,
and one-half of the couple's assets up to a maximum of $104,400.78 She is
also permitted to retain all of her income, and if that is less than a
designated amount, she may claim some income of the spouse who is in the
nursing home. After both the spouse in the nursing home and the
community spouse die, the state is permitted to recover the amount of
Medicaid spent for the nursing home from the value of the house retained
by the community spouse.79

Many advocates of the elderly are very upset about the treatment of the
well or community spouse and insist that she should be permitted to retain
more assets and income. However, to date, neither the state nor federal
governments have expressed any interest in permitting the community
spouse to have more income or savings.
Finally, Medicaid has strict rules that prohibit gifts by an elderly
individual in an attempt to become impoverished and create eligibility for
Medicaid. 80
The application for Medicaid requires informing the
government of any gifts made in the prior five years. 81 These gifts cause a
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period of ineligibility for Medicaid-with a longer period of ineligibility for
gifts that had a larger value.
To date, no movement has been made toward financing long-term care
by a dedicated tax or by mandatory or subsidized long-term care insurance.
Most Americans are oblivious to the risk and cost of long-term care. Only
when they or a family member need long-term care do they learn that
Medicaid is restricted to the impoverished. As a result, few purchase longterm care insurance and even fewer advocate for improved governmental
support of those in need of long-term care.
Other than saving money for state governments, there does not appear
to be any plan or ideology behind the impoverishment standard relied on by
Medicaid. Of course, the well-to-do have enough money to pay for their
own long-term care and even many of the middle class can afford to pay. It
is the lower-middle class and the lower class that must depend on Medicaid.
As a group, they are not aware of the problem, and they appear to lack the
political power to do anything about changing Medicaid. Consequently,
paying for long-term care apparently will continue to follow the welfare
model, where economic need is a prerequisite for assistance, rather than the
social-insurance model, where everyone in the risk pool is covered and
everyone helps pay for potential benefits.
The United States relies heavily on self-reliance as the solution to the
economic needs of the elderly. Perhaps that is because we are a nation of
immigrants, and so Americans lack a sense of social cohesiveness. Many
do not believe that each individual owes an obligation to all others, at least
not in a way that should be met by governmental action. Also, the myth
that, in America, "all is possible" contributes to the belief that poverty is a
result of personal failure rather than social conditions. Believing that they
will never be poor, many Americans resent paying taxes for the
"undeserving" poor. Finally, most Americans perceive the "state" as a
construct by individuals rather than a preexisting entity. As a result, they do
not think of the "state" assisting the elderly; rather, they see such financial
assistance as coming directly out of their pockets, and many do not want to
sacrifice their own well-being to assist others.
If the goal is to adequately protect the elderly, the enactment of
personal-savings accounts, the undercutting of Medicare and the failure to
address how to pay for the costs of long-term care are the wrong ways to
proceed. But that criticism misses the point that, for many Americans,
economic security is less important than personal autonomy. They are
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willing to risk poverty or even economic ruin rather than submit to higher
taxes to pay for social-insurance programs.
The debate as to the future of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid
is less about the effectiveness of policies and more about which values we
as a nation choose to promote. This can be thought of as a cage-match
battle between personal autonomy and personal security.
Because
Americans are profoundly divided as to which values to promote, the
government has been unable to formulate a coherent legislative response.
In light of the current political climate, there is little hope for national
consensus any time soon. The battle continues.

